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Abstract
Data poisoning—the process by which an attacker
takes control of a model by making imperceptible
changes to a subset of the training data—is an
emerging threat in the context of neural networks.
Existing attacks for data poisoning have relied on
hand-crafted heuristics. Instead, we pose crafting
poisons more generally as a bi-level optimization
problem, where the inner level corresponds to
training a network on a poisoned dataset and the
outer level corresponds to updating those poisons
to achieve a desired behavior on the trained model.
We then propose MetaPoison, a first-order method
to solve this optimization quickly. MetaPoison is
effective: it outperforms previous clean-label poi-
soning methods by a large margin under the same
setting. MetaPoison is robust: its poisons transfer
to a variety of victims with unknown hyperpa-
rameters and architectures. MetaPoison is also
general-purpose, working not only in fine-tuning
scenarios, but also for end-to-end training from
scratch with remarkable success, e.g. causing a
target image to be misclassified 90% of the time
via manipulating just 1% of the dataset. Addition-
ally, MetaPoison can achieve arbitrary adversary
goals not previously possible—like using poisons
of one class to make a target image don the la-
bel of another arbitrarily chosen class. Finally,
MetaPoison works in the real-world. We demon-
strate successful data poisoning of models trained
on Google Cloud AutoML Vision.
1. Introduction
Neural networks are susceptible to a range of security vul-
nerabilities that compromise their real-world reliability. The
bulk of work in recent years has focused on evasion attacks
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Athalye et al., 2018), where an input is
slightly modified at inference time to change a model’s pre-
diction. These methods rely on access to the inputs during
inference, which is not always available in practice.
*Equal contribution 1University of Maryland 2University of
Siegen 3US Naval Academy. Correspondence to: W. Ronny Huang
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Figure 1. High-level schematic of clean-label data poisoning. Our
goal as the attacker is to classify some bird image (here: the
parrot) as a dog. To do so, a small fraction of the training data
is imperceptibly modified before training. The network is then
trained from scratch with this modified dataset. After training,
validation performance is normal (eagle, owl, lovebird). However,
the minor modifications to the training set cause the (unaltered)
target image (parrot) to be misclassified by the neural network as
“dog” with high confidence.
Another type of attack is that of backdoor attacks (Turner
et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). Like evasion
attacks, backdoor attacks require adversary access to model
inputs during inference; notably backdoor “triggers” need
to be inserted into the training data and then later into the
input at inference time.
Unlike evasion and backdoor attacks, data poisoning does
not require attacker control of model inputs at inference
time. Here the attacker controls the model by adding ma-
nipulated images to the training set. These malicious im-
ages can be inserted into the training set by placing them
on the web (social media, multimedia posting services,
collaborative-editing forums, Wikipedia) and waiting for
them to be scraped by dataset harvesting bots. They can
also be added to the training set by a malicious insider who
is trying to avoid detection. A data corpus can also be com-
promised when arbitrary users may contribute data, such as
face images for a recognition and re-identification system.
Data poisoning attacks have been explored for classical sce-
narios (Biggio et al., 2012; Steinhardt et al., 2017; Burkard
& Lagesse, 2017) which allow both training inputs and la-
bels to be modified. However, it is possible to make poison
perturbations imperceptible to a human observer, as they
are in evasion attacks. Attacks of this type, schematic in
Figure 1, are often referred to as clean-label poisoning at-
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
22
5v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
 A
pr
 20
20
MetaPoison: Practical General-purpose Clean-label Data Poisoning
tacks (Koh & Liang, 2017; Shafahi et al., 2018) because
poison images appear to be unmodified and labeled correctly.
The perturbed images often affect classifier behavior on a
specific target instance that comes along after a system is de-
ployed, without affecting behavior on other inputs, making
clean-label attacks insidiously hard to detect.
In the dominant Feature Collision (FC) approach to clean-
label poisoning (Shafahi et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2019),
perturbations are used to modify a training image (e.g., a
tree) so that its feature representation is nearly identical
to that of a chosen target image (e.g., a stop sign). After
the victim fine tunes their model on the poisoned image,
the model cannot distinguish between the poison and target
image, causing it to misclassify the stop sign as a tree. FC
is a heuristic with limited applicability; the attacker must
have knowledge of the feature extractor being used, and
the feature extractor cannot substantially change after the
poison is introduced. For this reason, FC attacks only work
on fine-tuning and transfer learning pipelines, and fail when
the victim trains their model from scratch. Also, FC is not
general-purpose—an attacker could have objectives beyond
causing a single target instance to be misclassified with the
label of the poison.
We propose MetaPoison, an algorithm for crafting poison
images that manipulate the victim’s training pipeline to
achieve arbitrary model behaviors. First, we show that
MetaPoison outperforms FC methods by a large margin
in the established setting where a victim fine-tunes a pre-
trained model. We then demonstrate that MetaPoison suc-
ceeds in the challenging context where the victim trains
from scratch using random initializations. Next, we show
that MetaPoison attacks transfer to “black box” settings
where the victim uses training hyperparameters and network
architectures unknown to the attacker, making this attack
practical in the real-world. We verify its practicality by suc-
cessfully poisoning models on the Google Cloud AutoML
Vision platform. Finally we show that MetaPoison enables
a range of alternate adversary objectives beyond what is
achievable using feature collision, paving the way toward
full, arbitrary control of the victim model.
End-to-end code as well as pre-crafted poisons are available
at www.github.com/wronnyhuang/metapoison.
We encourage the reader to download, train, and evaluate
our poisoned CIFAR-10 dataset on their own CIFAR-10
training pipeline to verify MetaPoison’s effectiveness. We
discuss a few broader implications of this work in Sec.
J. Note, MetaPoison can also be used for non-nefarious
purposes, such as copyright enforcement. For example,
it can “watermark” copyrighted data with diverse, unde-
tectable perturbations. The model can then be queried with
the target (known only to copyright holder) to determine
whether the copyrighted data was used to train the model.
2. Method
2.1. Poisoning as constrained bi-level optimization
Suppose an attacker wishes to force an unaltered target
image xt of their choice to be assigned an incorrect, ad-
versarial label yadv by the victim model. The attacker can
add n poison images Xp ∈ [0, 255]n×m, where m is the
number of pixels, to the victim’s clean training set Xc. The
optimal poison images X∗p can be written as the solution to
the following optimization problem:
X∗p = argmin
Xp
Ladv(xt, yadv; θ∗(Xp)), (1)
where in general L(x, y; θ) is a loss function measuring how
accurately a model with weights θ assigns label y to input x.
For Ladv we use the Carlini & Wagner (2017) function and
call it the adversarial loss. θ∗(Xp) are the network weights
found by training on the poisoned training data Xc ∪Xp,
which contain the poison images Xp mixed in with mostly
clean data Xc ∈ [0, 255]N×m, where N  n. Note that
(1) is a bi-level optimization problem (Bard, 2013) – the
minimization for Xp involves the weights θ∗(Xp), which
are themselves the minimizer of the training problem,
θ∗(Xp) = argmin
θ
Ltrain(Xc ∪Xp, Y ; θ), (2)
where Ltrain is the standard cross entropy loss, and Y ∈
ZN+n contains the correct labels of the clean and poison
images. Thus, (1) and (2) together elucidate the high level
formulation for crafting poison images: find Xp such that
the adversarial loss Ladv(xt, yadv; θ∗(Xp)) is minimized
after training.
For the attack to be inconspicuous, each poison example
xp should be constrained to “look similar” to a natural base
example x. A number of perceptually aligned perturba-
tion models have been proposed (Engstrom et al., 2019;
Wong et al., 2019; Ghiasi et al., 2020). We chose the Re-
ColorAdv perturbation function of Laidlaw & Feizi (2019),
which applies a function fg, with parameters g, and an
additive perturbation map δ, resulting in a poison image
xp = fg(x) + δ. The function fg(x) is a pixel-wise color
remapping fg : C → C where C is the 3-dimensional
LUV color space. To ensure that the perturbation is min-
imal, fg can be bounded such that for every pixel xi,
‖fg(xi) − xi‖∞ < c, and δ can be bounded such that
‖δ‖∞ < . We use the standard additive bound of  = 8
and a tighter-than-standard color bound of c = 0.04 to
further obscure the perturbation (Laidlaw & Feizi (2019)
used c = 0.06). To enforce these bounds, we optimize for
Xp with PGD (Madry et al., 2017), projecting the outer-
parameters g and δ back to their respective c and  balls
after every gradient step. Example poisons along with their
clean counterparts used in this work are shown later in Fig-
ure 4 (top left).
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Figure 2. Schematic of MetaPoison in weight space. (Left) During the poison crafting stage, the computation graph is unrolled by K SGD
steps in order to compute a perturbation to the poisons, ∇XpLadv. Optimally perturbed poisons steer the weights (red arrows) toward
regions of low Ladv regardless of which training stage θj0 the poisons are inserted. (Right) When the victim trains on the poisoned data, the
weight trajectory is collectively and implicitly steered to regions of low Ladv whilst the learner explicitly drives the weights to regions of
low Ltrain.
2.2. Crafting versatile poisoning examples efficiently
Minimizing the full bi-level objective in (1)-(2) is in-
tractable; a computation graph that explicitly unrolls 105
SGD steps would not fit on any modern-day machine. Fur-
thermore, the gradients would likely vanish or explode in
such a deep graph. We can, however, build a computation
graph that unrolls the training pipeline through a few SGD
steps. This allows us to “look ahead” in training and view
how perturbations to poisons now will impact the adver-
sarial loss a few steps into the future. For example, the
process of unrolling two inner-level SGD steps to compute
an outer-level update on the poisons would be
θ1 = θ0 − α∇θLtrain(Xc ∪Xp, Y ; θ0)
θ2 = θ1 − α∇θLtrain(Xc ∪Xp, Y ; θ1)
Xi+1p = X
i
p − β∇XpLadv(xt, yadv; θ2), (3)
where α and β are the learning rate and crafting rate, respec-
tively. Once optimized, the poisons should ideally lower
the adversarial loss Ladv after a few SGD steps regardless
of where they’re inserted along the network trajectory, as
illustrated in Figure 2 (left). When used to train a victim
model, the poisons should implicitly “steer” the weights
toward low Ladv whilst the learner drives the weights toward
low training loss Ltrain. When poisoning is successful, the
victim should end up with a weight vector that achieves both
low Ladv and Ltrain despite only having explicitly trained for
low Ltrain, as shown in Figure 2 (right).
The idea of unrolling the training pipeline to solve an outer
optimization problem has been applied to meta-learning
(Finn et al., 2017), neural architecture search (Liu et al.,
2018), and even simple data poisoning (Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez
et al., 2017). However, unique challenges arise when using
this method for general-purpose data poisoning.
First, the training process depends on weight initialization
and minibatching order, which are determined at random
and unknown to the attacker. This is in contrast to meta-
learning and architecture search, where the same agent has
purview into both the inner (training their own networks)
and outer processes (updating the weight initialization or
architecture). Second, we find that jointly training the net-
work weights and poisons causes poisons to overfit to the
weights in the last epochs of training while forgetting how
to steer newly initialized weights toward low Ladv regions
in the beginning of the training journey.
We address these two challenges via ensembling and net-
work re-initialization. Poisons are crafted using an ensemble
of models, each on a different epoch of training. At each
step we alternate between updating poisons and updating
model weights. Once a model has trained for a sentinel
number of epochs, it is re-initialized with randomly sam-
pled weights and started from scratch. Specifically, each
update has the form
Xi+1p = X
i
p −
β
Nepoch
Nepoch∑
j=0
∇XpLadv
∣∣∣
θj
. (4)
Ladv
∣∣∣
θj
is the adversarial loss after a few look-ahead SGD
steps on the poisoned dataset starting from weights θj (taken
from the j-th epoch). This unrolled gradient is explicitly
written out in (3), where θj here corresponds to θ0 in (3).
Note the set of weight vectors {θj} are drawn from different
stages of training with different random initializations, thus
preventing overfitting to any single stage of training or any
particular initialization.
Finally, note that we use a standard network training process
in which minibatches are sampled at random. For this rea-
son, each minibatch has some subset of poison images, or
sometimes no poisons at all. This raises a synchronization
issue because the update rule in (4) expects all poisons—or
at least the same subset of poisons across the ensemble—to
be present at the current step. We address this by training
the network for an entire epoch during which each example
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appears once. When a poison xp appears in the current mini-
batch, the computation graph is unrolled and the update to
that poison ∇xpLadv is stored. At the end of the epoch, the
updates for all poisons are concatenated into ∇XpLadv and
only then is the outer step (4) taken once. The entire process
is outlined in Algorithm 1.1 Crafting a set of 500 poisons
for 60 steps on CIFAR-10 takes about 6 GPU-hours.
Algorithm 1 Crafting poison examples via MetaPoison
1: Input Training set of images and labels (X,Y ) of size
N , target image xt, adversarial class yadv,  and c
thresholds, n  N subset of images to be poisoned,
T range of training epochs, M randomly initialized
models.
2: Begin
3: Stagger the M models, training the mth model weights
θm up to bmT/Mc epochs
4: Select n images from the training set to be poisoned,
denoted by Xp. Remaining clean images denoted Xc
5: For i = 1, . . . , C crafting steps:
6: For m = 1, . . . ,M models:
7: Copy θ˜ = θm
8: For k = 1, . . . ,K unroll steps:
9: θ˜ = θ˜ − α∇θ˜Ltrain(Xc ∪Xp, Y ; θ˜)
10: Store adversarial loss Lm = Ladv(xt, yadv; θ˜)
11: Advance epoch θm=θm−α∇θmLtrain(X,Y ; θm)
12: If θm is at epoch T + 1:
13: Reset θm to epoch 0 and reinitialize
14: Average adversarial losses Ladv =
∑M
m=1 Lm/M
15: Compute ∇XpLadv
16: Update Xp using Adam and project onto , c ball
17: Return Xp
3. Experiments
Our experiments on CIFAR-10 consist of two stages: poison
crafting and victim evaluation. In the first stage, we craft
poisons on surrogate models and save them for evaluation.
In the second stage, we insert the poisons into the victim
dataset, train the victim model from scratch on this dataset,
and report the attack success and validation accuracy. We
declare an attack successful only if the target instance xt
is classified as the adversarial class yadv; it doesn’t count
if the target is classified into any other class, incorrect or
not. The attack success rate is defined as the number of
successes over the number of attacks attempted.
Unless stated otherwise, our experimental settings are as
follows. The first n examples in the poisons’ class are used
1For brevity in Algorithm 1, we write as if unrolled SGD steps
are taken using the full dataset. In practice they are taken on
minibatches and repeated until the full dataset is flushed once
through. Aside from minor details, the two are equivalent.
as the base images in the poison set Xp and are perturbed,
while the remaining images in CIFAR-10 are used as the
clean set Xc and are untouched. The target image is taken
from the CIFAR-10 test set. We perform 60 outer steps
when crafting poisons using the Adam optimizer with an
initial learning rate of 200. We decay the outer learning
rate (i.e. crafting rate) by 10 every 20 steps. Section A
analyzes the crafting process in more depth. Each inner
learner is unrolled by K = 2 SGD steps to compute Ladv.
Other K’s were explored in Sec. F. An ensemble of 24 inner
models is used, with model i trained until the ith epoch. A
batchsize of 125 and learning rate of 0.1 are used and the
weights are updated via SGD. We leave weight decay and
data augmentation off by default, but analyze performance
with them on in Sec. 3.3. By default, we use the same
6-layer ConvNet architecture with batch normalization as
Finn et al. (2017), henceforth called ConvNetBN, but other
architectures are demonstrated throughout the paper too.
Outside of Sec. 3.3, the same inner model settings are used
for victim evaluation. We train each victim to 200 epochs,
decaying the learning rate by 10 at epochs 100 and 150. Sec.
B shows example victim training curves with poisoned data.
3.1. Comparison to previous work
Previous works on clean-label poisoning from Koh & Liang
(2017), Shafahi et al. (2018), and Zhu et al. (2019) attack
models that are pre-trained on a clean/standard dataset and
then fine-tuned on a poisoned dataset. We compare MetaPoi-
son to Shafahi et al. (2018), who crafted poisons using fea-
ture collisions in a white-box setting where the attacker has
knowledge of the pretrained CIFAR-10 AlexNet-like classi-
fier weights. They assume the victim fine-tunes using the
entire CIFAR-10 dataset. Critical to their success was the
“watermark trick”: they superimpose a 30% opacity water-
mark of the target image onto every poison image before
crafting applying their additive perturbation. For evaluation,
Shafahi et al. (2018) compared two poison-target class pairs,
frog-airplane and dog-bird, and ran poisoning attacks on
30 randomly selected target instances for each class pair.
They also varied the number of poisons. We replicate this
scenario as closely as possible using poisons crafted via
MetaPoison. Since the perturbation model in Shafahi et al.
(2018) was additive only (no ReColorAdv), we set c = 0
in MetaPoison. We also use the watermark trick at 30%
opacity. To apply MetaPoison in the fine-tuning setting, we
first pretrain a network to 100 epochs and use this fixed net-
work to initialize weights when crafting poisons or running
victim evaluations.
Our comparison results are presented in Figure 3 (top). No-
tably, 100% attack success is reached at about 25 poisons
out of 50000 total training examples, or a poison budget of
only 0.05%. In general, MetaPoison achieves much higher
success rates at much lower poison budgets as compared to
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Figure 3. Comparison with Shafahi et al. (2018) (SHN18) under
the same fine-tuning conditions for a watermark opacity of 30%.
(Top) Success rates. (Middle/Bottom) Penultimate-layer feature
representation visualization of the target and poison class examples
before/after fine-tuning on the poisoned dataset. Like Shafahi et al.,
we project the representations along the line connecting centroids
of the two classes (x-axis) and along the orthogonal component of
the classification-layer parameter vector (y-axis). This projection
ensures that we are able to see activity at the boundaries between
these two classes.
the previous method, showcasing the strength of its poisons
to alter victim behavior in the case of fine-tuning.
The fine-tuning scenario also provides a venue to look closer
into the mechanics of the attack. In the feature collision at-
tack (Shafahi et al., 2018), the poisons are all crafted to share
the same feature representation as that of the target in the
penultimate layer of the network. When the features in the
penultimate layer are visualized, the poisons are overlapped,
or collided, with the target (Figure 3b in original paper). We
perform the same visualization in Figure 3 (middle) for a
successful attack with 5 poisons using MetaPoison. Intrigu-
ingly, our poisons do not collide with the target, implying
that they employ some other mechanism to achieve the same
objective. They do not even reside in the target class distri-
bution, which may render neighborhood conformity tests
such as Papernot & McDaniel (2018); Peri et al. (2019) less
effective as a defense. Figure 3 (bottom) shows the feature
representations after fine-tuning. The target switches sides
of the class boundary, and dons the incorrect poison label.
These visualizations show that MetaPoisons cause feature
extraction layers to push the target in the direction of the
poison class without relying on feature collision-based me-
chanics. Indeed, the poisoning mechanisms of MetaPoison
are learned rather than hand-crafted; like adversarial exam-
ples, they likely do not lend themselves to an easy human
interpretation.
3.2. Victim training from scratch
Usually fine-tuning datasets tend to be small, domain-
specific, and well-curated; from a practical perspective, it
may be harder to inject poisons into them. On the other
hand, large datasets on which models are (pre)trained from
scratch are often scraped from the web, making them easier
to poison. Thus, a general-purpose poisoning method that
works on models trained from scratch would be far more
viable. Yet no prior clean-label poisoning attack has been
demonstrated against networks trained from scratch. This is
because existing feature collision-based poisoning (Shafahi
et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2019) requires a pre-existing feature
extractor on which to craft a feature collision.
In this section, we demonstrate the viability of MetaPoison
against networks trained from scratch. For consistency, we
focus on the same dog-bird and frog-plane class pairs as in
previous work. To be thorough, however, we did a large
study of all possible class pairs in Sec. C and showed that
these two class pairs are representative in terms of poisoning
performance. We also found that even within the same
poison-target class pair, different target images resulted
in different poisoning success rates (Sec. D). Therefore,
for each class pair, we craft 10 sets of poisons targeting
the corresponding first 10 image IDs of the target class
taken from the CIFAR-10 test set and aggregate their results.
Finally, different training runs have different results due to
training stochasticity (Sec. B). Therefore, for each set of
poisons, we train 6 victim networks with different random
seeds and record the target image’s label inferred by each
model. In all, there are 60 labels, or votes: 6 for each of
10 different target images. We then tally up the votes for
each class. For example, Figure 4 (lower left) shows the
number of votes each label receives for the target birds out
of 60 models. In unpoisoned models, the true class (bird)
receives most of the votes. In models where just 1% of the
dataset is poisoned, the target birds get incorrectly voted
as dog a majority of the time. Examples of some poison
dogs along with their clean counterparts, as well as one
of the target birds, are shown in Figure 4 (top left). More
are displayed in Sec. K. Section E shows success rate and
perceptual differences for various perturbation magnitudes.
In Figure 4 (top right), we repeat the experiments for multi-
ple poison budgets and network architectures. The success
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Figure 4. Poisoning end-to-end training from scratch. (Top left) Examples of poisoned training data. (Bottom left) Tally of the classes into
which target birds are classified over 60 victim models on ConvNetBN. 6 models are trained with different random seeds for each of 10
target birds, totaling 60 victim models. (Top right) Attack success rate vs poison budget for different architectures and poison-target class
pairs. (Bottom right) Validation accuracy of poisoned models. Note that a poison budget of 10−3 percent is equivalent to zero poisons as
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Figure 5. Penultimate layer visualization as a function of epoch for
a successful train-from-scratch attack of 50 poisons. The target
(blue triangle) is moved toward the poison distribution by the
crafted poisons.
rates drop most steeply between 1% and 0.1%, but remain
viable even beyond 0.01% budget. Remarkably, even a
single perturbed dog can occasionally poison ResNet-20.
The unexpected drop in success above 5% budget may be
attributable to the large number of poisons overfitting the
particular weight trajectories seen during crafting. In Figure
4 (bottom right), we verify that our poisons cause negligible
effect on overall model performance except for a small drop
at 10% poison budget.
We again gain clues to the poisoning mechanism through
feature space visualization. We view the penultimate layer
features at multiple epochs in Figure 5. In epoch 0, the
classes are not well separated, since the network is trained
from scratch. As training evolves the earlier-layer feature
extractors learn to separate the classes in the penultimate
layer. They do not learn to separate the target instance, but
they instead steadily usher the target from its own distribu-
tion to the poison class distribution as training progresses
to epoch 199, impervious to the forces of class separation.
In addition, the distribution of poisons seems to be biased
toward the side of the target class. This suggests that the
poisons adopt features similar to the specific target image to
such an extent that the network no longer has the capacity
to class-separate the target from the poisons. See Sec. I for
additional visualizations and insights.
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Figure 6. Robustness to different training settings and architec-
tures. (Top) Success rate on a victim ConvNetBN with different
training settings. (Bottom) Success rate of poisons crafted on one
architecture and evaluated on another.
3.3. Robustness and transferability
So far our results have demonstrated that the crafted poisons
transfer to new initializations and training runs. Yet often
the exact training settings and architecture used by the vic-
tim are also different than the ones used to craft the poisons.
We investigate the robustness of our poisons to changes in
these choices. In Figure 6 (top), we train victim models with
different training settings, like learning rate, batch size, and
regularizers, on poisons crafted using ConvNetBNs with
a single baseline setting (0.1 learning rate, 125 batch size,
no regularization). Again using the dog-bird pair, poison
dogs were crafted for 8 different target birds and 24 vic-
tim models were trained per target. Our results show that
the poisons are overall quite robust to changes. Data aug-
mentation (standard CIFAR-10 procedure of random crops
and horizontal flips) and large changes in learning rate or
batch size cause some, but not substantial degradation in
success. The robustness to data augmentation is surprising;
one could’ve conceived that the relatively large changes by
data augmentation would nullify the poisoning effect. Ar-
chitecture transferability was studied in Zhu et al. (2019)
for fine-tuned models. Here we study them in trained-from-
scratch models using MetaPoison. In Figure 6 (bottom), we
craft poisons on one architecture and naively evaluate them
on another, in contrast to Zhu et al. (2019) where poisons are
crafted on an ensemble of architectures. The performance
is remarkable. ConvNetBN, VGG13, and ResNet20 are
very different architectures, yet poisons transfer between
them. Interestingly the attack success rate is non-symmetric.
Poisons created on VGG13 do not work nearly as well on
ResNet20 as ResNet20 poisons on VGG13. One explanation
for this is that VGG13 does not have batch normalization,
which may have a regularizing effect on poison crafting.
3.4. Real-world poisoning on Google Cloud AutoML
We further evaluate the robustness of MetaPoison on Google
Cloud AutoML Vision,2 a real-world, enterprise-grade, truly
black-box victim learning system. Designed for the end-user,
Cloud AutoML hides all training and architecture informa-
tion, leaving the user only the ability to upload a dataset and
specify wallclock training budget and model latency grade.
For each model, we upload CIFAR-10, poisoned with the
same poison dogs crafted earlier on ResNet20, and train for
1000 millinode-hours on the mobile-high-accuracy-1 grade.
After training, we deploy the poisoned model on Google
Cloud and upload the target bird for prediction. Figure 7
shows web UI screenshots of the prediction results on un-
poisoned (top left) and poisoned (top right) Cloud AutoML
models. MetaPoison works even in a realistic setting such as
this. To quantify performance, we train 20 Cloud AutoML
victims, 2 for each of the first 10 target birds, and average
their results in Figure 7 (bottom left and right) at various
budgets. At poison budgets as low as 0.5%, we achieve suc-
cess rates of>15%, with little impact on validation accuracy.
These results show that data poisoning presents a credible
threat to real-world systems; even popular ML-as-a-service
systems are not immune to such threats.
10 1 100 101
poison budget (%)
0.0
0.1
0.2
su
cc
es
s r
at
e
10 1 100 101
poison budget (%)
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
va
lid
at
io
n 
ac
c.
Figure 7. Data poisoning Google Cloud AutoML Vision models.
Web UI screenshots of prediction results on target bird by Cloud
AutoML models trained on (Top left) clean and (Top right) poi-
soned CIFAR-10 datasets. Portions of the screenshot were cropped
and resized for a clearer view. (Bottom left) Success rates and (Bot-
tom right) validation accuracies averaged across multiple targets
and training runs as a function of poison budget on the poison-dog-
target-bird pair.
2cloud.google.com/automl
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3.5. Alternative poisoning schemes
Thus far we have discussed targeted poisoning attacks un-
der a collision scheme: inject poisons from class yp to
cause a specific instance in class yt to be classified as yp,
where yp 6= yt. In other words, the adversarial class is
set to be the poison class, yadv = yp. This scheme was
specially suited for the feature collision approach, and in-
deed is the only scheme possible under that method. How-
ever, it is only a subset of the space of possible schemes
Yscheme : (yp, yt, yadv). Since MetaPoison does not use
hand-crafted heuristics, but learns to craft poison examples
directly from a given outer objective L(xt, yadv; θ∗(Xp)),
the attacker can define a wide variety of other objectives.
We will demonstrate MetaPoison’s versatility through two
example schemes.
3.5.1. SELF-CONCEALMENT SCHEME
Here, the poisons are injected to cause a target image in
the same class to be misclassified, i.e. yp = yt 6= yadv.
This could be employed by an attacker who presents mul-
tiple poisoned views of himself (e.g. reference face im-
ages), so that he can later evade detection when presenting
the target view of himself. To craft a self-concealment at-
tack, we set our adversarial loss function as Ladv(Xp) =
− log [1− pθ∗(Xp)(xt, yt)], so that higher misclassifica-
tion of the target lowers the loss. We evaluate the self-
concealment scheme on two poison-target pairs, bird-bird
and airplane-airplane. Note that the poison and target classes
are identical by definition of the scheme. We use a poison
budget of 10% and craft 5 sets of poisons targeting the first
5 bird or airplane IDs. We then train 4 victim networks
for each set of poisons totaling 20 votes for each pair. We
tally up votes in Figure 8 (top). For unpoisoned models,
the correct label receives the clear majority as expected,
while for poisoned models, the votes are distributed across
multiple classes without a clear majority. Importantly the
true class (bird or airplane) receives almost no votes. Using
definition of success as misclassification of the target into
any other class, the success rates are 100% and 95% for bird
and airplane, respectively.
3.5.2. MULTICLASS-POISON SCHEME
In cases where the number of classes is high, it can be
difficult to assume a large poison budget for any single class.
Here we demonstrate one solution: creating poisons coming
from multiple classes acting toward the same adversary goal.
For simplicity, we craft poisons from classes uniformly
distributed across the 10 available classes (with 1% poison
budget in each). Again our goal is to cause a target bird to
be assigned an incorrect label yadv. For each yadv that we
choose, we craft 10 sets of poisons corresponding to the
first 10 target bird IDs. 6 victims are trained for each set
of poisons, totaling 60 votes. We use a poison budget of
10%. Our results in Figure 8 (bottom) tally the votes into
9 histograms, one for each yadv setting. For most of the
9 histograms, the class that receives the most votes is the
adversarial class. On average, the adversarial class takes
about 50% of the votes cast (i.e. 50% success). This attack
shows that the poisons need not come exclusively from
one class and that it’s possible to use poisoning to arbitrary
control victim label assignment.
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Figure 8. Alternative poisoning schemes. (Top) Self-concealment:
images from the same class as the target are poisoned to “push” the
target out of its own class. (Bottom) Multiclass-poisoning: images
from multiple classes are poisoned to cause the target bird to be
classified as a chosen adversarial class yadv.
4. Conclusion
MetaPoison is an algorithm for finding dataset perturbations
that control victim model behavior on specific targets. It out-
performs previous clean-label poisoning methods on fine-
tuned models, and achieves considerable success—for the
first time—on models trained from scratch. It also enables
novel attack schemes like self-concealment and multiclass-
poison. The poisons are robust and practical, working even
when transferred to black-box ML-as-a-service models. We
hope MetaPoison establishes a baseline for data poisoning
work and promotes awareness of this very real and emerging
threat vector.
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Supplementary Material
A. Poison crafting curves
Our poisons in the main paper were all crafted with 60 outer
steps, also called craft steps. Here we investigate the outer
optimization process in more depth and show the potential
benefits of optimizing longer. As a testbed, we consider
poison frogs attacking a target airplane with a poison budget
of 10%. During the crafting stage, the adversarial loss–we
use the Carlini & Wagner (2017) loss here–is the objective
to be minimized. This loss has the property that when it is
less than zero, the target is successfully misclassified as the
adversarial class. Conversely, when it is greater than zero,
the target is classified into a class other than the adversarial
class.
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Figure 9. Ablation study on the number of craftsteps. (Top) The
crafting adversarial loss (blue line), which is averaged across all
24 models in the ensemble, is the objective to be minimized in
the outer loop of the bi-level optimization problem. We save the
state of the poisons at every several craftsteps, fully train 20 victim
models from scratch on each of those poisons, and plot the average
adversarial loss on the target across those victim models (orange
line). (Bottom) Attack success rate across the 20 victim models
for each craft step.
The blue line in Figure 9 (top) shows the adversarial loss
averaged over all the surrogate models during the craft-
ing stage. It rapidly decreases up to craftstep 25 and then
plateaus. It never sinks below zero, which means that insert-
ing these poisons into a minibatch will not cause the model
to misclassify the target two look-ahead SGD steps later,
on average. However, it belies the fact that the cumulative
effect of the poisons will collectively influence the model
to misclassify the target after many SGD steps. Indeed, the
fact that the adversarial loss (blue line) is decreased after 25
craft steps from ∼9 to ∼4 is an indication that the poisons
provide a small nudge to the model toward misclassifying
the target even after two look-ahead SGD steps, as compared
to having no poisons.
The orange line in Figure 9 (top) shows the adversarial
loss on the target image on poisoned victim models at each
stage of crafting. To obtain this curve, we saved the state of
the poisons every several craft steps, and trained 20 victim
models from scratch on each of them. Interestingly, even
though the crafting adversarial loss (blue line) plateaus, the
effectiveness of the poisons continues to increase with the
number of craft steps even up to 200 steps. Therefore, one
cannot judge from the crafting curve alone how well the
poisons will do during victim evaluation. Finally, Figure
9 (bottom) shows the corresponding attack success rate for
the poisons at each craft step.
B. Victim training curves
In the main paper, we reported the attack success rates and
validation accuracy at the end of victim training. In this
section, we take a closer look at the effect of data poisoning
at each step of training.
We again use the dog-bird class pair as our prototypical
example and we randomly select target bird with ID 5. We
train ResNet20 models with 3 different poisoning levels:
unpoisoned, poisoned with 0.5% budget, and poisoned with
5% budget. Since the training of each victim model is in-
herently stochastic and we desire to see the overall effect of
poisoning, we train 72 victim models with different seeds
for each of these 3 poisoning levels. Figure 10 displays all
72 curves for each poisoning level. The training accuracy
curves, in Figure 10 (top), show the models quickly overfit-
ting to the CIFAR10 dataset after about 20k optimization
steps, or 50 epochs. The rate of convergence is equal for
all 3 poisoning levels. Likewise, the validation accuracy
curves, Figure 10 (middle), converge to about 80% after
20k steps and are also indistinguishable between poisoning
levels. These curves show that it is impossible to detect
the presence of poisoning through looking at training or
validation curves.
Next, we look at the evolution of the adversarial loss, or
Carlini & Wagner (2017) loss, over optimization step in
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Figure 10. Training curves from scratch with different random
seeds on poisoned and unpoisoned datasets over 200 epochs
on ResNet20. (Top) Accuracy on training set perfectly overfits
to CIFAR-10 after about 20k optimization steps, or 50 epochs.
(Middle) Validation accuracy curve looks the same regardless of
whether the dataset is poisoned or not. (Bottom) Carlini-Wagner
(CW) adversarial loss on specific target bird (ID 5) as a function
of optimization step. CW loss above zero indicates the target bird
is classified correctly, while below zero indicates the target bird is
misclassified as a dog. Unpoisoned models have adversarial loss
entirely above zero, while 5% poisoned models have adversarial
loss entirely below zero. 0.5% poisoned models have CW loss
straddling both sides of zero.
Figure 10 (bottom). Recall that in the Carlini & Wagner
(2017) loss, negative values correspond to attack success
while positive values correspond to attack failure. Note also
that, under almost all practical scenarios, the victim does
not see this curve since they are unaware of the target image
chosen by the adversary.
At the start, epoch 0, the adversarial loss of all models are
at roughly the same level. As training proceeds, the adver-
sarial loss trifurcates into 3 distinct levels corresponding
to the 3 poisoning levels. The unpoisoned models see in-
creasing adversarial loss up to fully positive values (perfect
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Figure 11. Success rates for all possible poison-target class pairs.
Each success rate is the average of the first 5 unique targets with 2
victim training runs per unique target.
attack failure) of around 12 before they plateau, while the
high 5% poisoned models see decreasing adversarial loss
down to mostly negative values (near-perfect attack success)
of around −6 before plateauing. The moderate 0.5% poi-
soned models see slight decrease in adversarial loss and
hover around zero (some attack success) for the remainder
of training. Compared to the training and validation curves,
these adversarial loss curves fluctuate a lot both between
optimization steps as well as between models. This is ex-
pected since they are the loss of a single image rather than
an aggregate of images. Despite the fluctuation, however,
the effect of different poisoning levels on the attack outcome
is very clear.
C. Performance on other poison-target class
pairs
In the main paper, we primarily mimicked the two exem-
plary poison-target class pairs (dog-bird, frog-airplane) from
previous work in Shafahi et al. (2018). To ensure that our
results do not just happen to work well on these two pairs
but rather works well for all class pairs, we perform a large
study on all 100 possible poison-target pairs in CIFAR-10,
shown in Figure 11.
For each pair, we craft with a poison budget of 10%, target
the first 5 target IDs for that particular target class, and
run 2 victim trainings from scratch for each pair, allowing
the reported success rate to result from the average of 10
victim models. To enable such a large study within our
computational runtime constraints, we use only 10% of
the CIFAR-10 dataset as our training set. This is justified
since we are interested here in the relative performance of
different class pairs with respect to our exemplary class pairs
(dog-bird, frog-airplane) on which we did full CIFAR-10
studies in the main paper.
The results show that poisoning can be successful under all
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Figure 12. Success rates for the first 20 unique target airplanes for
a poison frog target airplane situation. Each success rate is the
average of 12 victim training runs.
class pair situations. Our exemplary pairs, dog-bird and frog-
airplane, have average poisoning vulnerability relative to all
the other pairs, with the dog-bird slightly more vulnerable
than frog-airplane. The most difficult target class on which
to cause misclassification is truck, while the most easy is
frog. The least powerful poison class is truck, while the
most powerful is tied between car, cat, deer, frog, and horse.
The high success rates along the diagonal trivially indicate
that it is easy to cause the target to be classified into the
correct class.
D. Differences in success rates amongst
different targets
It is also informative to see how the success rate varies
amongst different choices of the target image for a fixed tar-
get class. Even though the target class is the same, different
images within that class may have very different features,
making it harder or easier for the poisons to compromise
them. In Figure 12, we plot the attack success rates for the
first 20 unique target airplanes when attacked by poison
frogs. Each success rate is the result of 20 victim training
runs. Indeed, the success rate is highly variable amongst
different target images, indicating that the poisoning success
is more dependent on the specific target image that the adver-
sary wishes to attack rather than the choice of poison-target
class pair.
E. Ablation study on perturbation magnitude
We present an ablation study for different additive and color
perturbation bounds in Figure 13 for one particular dog-bird
attack (bird ID 0) with 1% poison budget. While our ex-
periments use modest values of (, c) = (8, 0.04), there is
room to increase the bounds to achieve higher success with-
out significant perceptual change as shown by an example
poison dog in the figure. In contrast, even extremely min-
imal perturbations (, c) = (2, 0.02) can achieve notable
poisoning.
Figure 13. Ablation study of perturbation. We vary the strength of
the attack by modifiying the allowed `∞-perturbation  (y-axis)
and the color perturbation c (x-axis) and show an exemplary
poison image (from the batch of 1% poison images). The green
bars show attack success. Note that the baseline used in all other
experiments in this paper is a color perturbation c of 0.04 and
additive perturbation  of 8.
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Figure 14. Ablation study on the number of unroll steps. Using
a single unroll step during crafting will produce inferior poisons,
but using a modest number between 2 and 9 seems to result in
the same performance more or less. Even large numbers of unroll
steps may improve the performance slightly.
F. Ablation study on number of unroll steps
used during crafting
We now investigate how far we should look ahead during
the crafting process, or for how many SGD steps we should
unroll the inner optimization. It turns out a low-order ap-
proximation, or small number of unrolls, is sufficient when
our ensembling and network reinitialization strategy is used.
Figure 14 shows the attack success rate for various choices
of the number of unroll steps, or K as defined in Algorithm
1. A single unroll step is insufficient to achieve high success
rates, but having the number of unroll steps be between 2 and
9 seems to not affect the result much. At even higher num-
ber of unroll steps (12), the success rate increases slightly.
We thus recommend using 2 unroll steps as it performs well
while minimizing computational costs.
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Figure 15. Poison crafting stability and subsampling. (Top) His-
togram of adversarial loss from 300 different victim models. Each
histogram represents a different set of 500 poison dogs crafted
using different random seeds. (Bottom) Histogram of adversarial
loss from 300 different victim models for a set of 500 poison dogs
that are subsampled from a set of 5000 poison dogs. The base IDs
of the 500 subsampled poison dogs are identical to the 500 base
IDs used in Figure 15 (top).
G. Stability of poison crafting
A reliable poison crafting algorithm should produce poisons
of the same effectiveness under the same conditions with
different random seeds. In nonconvex optimization, this is
not always the case. MetaPoison’s optimization procedure
to craft poisons is certainly nonconvex, and it’s unclear how
the adversarial loss landscape looks like; therefore, in this
section, we take a look at the stability of the poison crafting
process.
We craft 6 sets of poisons under the same settings (500
poison dogs, target bird with ID 5) with different random
seeds and compare their victim evaluation results. Since
there is already stochasticity in training a victim model even
for the same set of poisons (see, e.g., Sec. B), we train 300
victim models on each set of poisons and plot a histogram of
the resulting adversarial loss for each in Figure 15 (top). The
histograms overlap one another almost perfectly, indicating
that the poison crafting process is generally pretty stable
and the crafted poisons will have similar potencies from
run to run. For this particular example, the adversarial loss
distribution happens to center around zero, where the half
on the left represent models that are successfully poisoned
while the half on the right represent models that are not (a
property of the Carlini & Wagner (2017) loss function).
H. Subsampling poisons from a larger set
One practical question is whether poisons crafted together
work together to influence the victim training dynamics
toward the desired behavior (i.e. lowering adversarial loss),
or if each poison individually does its part in nudging the
victim weights toward the desired behavior. Posed another
way, if we subsample a larger poison set to the desired
poison budget, would the resulting adversarial loss be the
same as if we had directly crafted with the desired poison
budget? This question is quite practical because in many
cases the attacker cannot guarantee that the entire poison set
will be included into the victim dataset, even if some subset
of it will likely trickle into the dataset.
We investigate the effect of subsampling poisons. We sub-
sample a set of 500 poison dogs from a larger set of 5000
poison dogs. The 500 base IDs of the subset are identical
to the base IDs used in Figure 15 (top) for fair comparison.
The poisons are crafted 6 times and the resulting adversarial
loss histograms (each the result of 300 victim models) are
shown in Figure 15 (bottom).
First, notice that the histograms overlap in this case, again
demonstrating the stability of the crafting process. Sur-
prisingly, the histograms are more skewed toward negative
adversarial loss than those in Figure 15 (top), revealing that
subsampling to the desired poison budget achieves better
performance than crafting with the poison budget directly.
This result is advantageous for the attacker because it relaxes
the requirement that the entire poison set must be included
into the victim dataset without missing any. This result is
also counter-intuitive as it suggests that the direct method
crafting for a desired poison budget is inferior to the indirect
method of crafting for a larger budget and then taking a
random subset of the poisons with the desired poison budget
size. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may
be that the higher dimensionality of a larger poison budget
helps the optimization process find minima more quickly,
similar to the way that the overparameterization of neural
networks helps to speed up optimization (Sankararaman
et al., 2019).
Our experiments in the main paper, in Figures 4 and 7,
varied the poison budget by taking a different-sized subsets
from a common set of 5000 poisons.
I. Feature visualizations by layer
Poisoned training data influences victim models to misclas-
sify a specific target. While they are optimized explicitly
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Figure 16. Feature visualization as a function of network layer in
ConvNetBN for a successful attack of 50 poisons. Blue circles
correspond to target class data, while green circles correspond to
poison class data. The poisons (red circles) cluster in the target
class cluster in the earlier layers. In the last layer, conv5, the
poisons and target (blue triangle) move to the poison class cluster
and the target is misclassified.
to do this via a loss function, the mechanism by which the
poisons do this remains elusive. In addition to Figure 5, we
use feature visualization as a way to inspect what is hap-
pening inside the neural network during poisoning. Figure
5 showed the evolution of the features in the penultimate
layer across multiple epochs of training. Here, in Figure 16,
we visualize the evolution of the features as they propagate
through the different layers of the trained (epoch 199) Con-
vNetBN victim network. The projection method used is the
same as that in Sec. 3.1.
Like in Figure 5, the blue points on the left of each panel
are data points in the target class, while the green points on
the right are data points in the poison class. The target is
denoted by the blue triangle and the poisons are denoted by
red circles. The data in the two classes are initially poorly
separated in the first layer (conv1) and become more sep-
arable with increasing depth. Interestingly, the poisons do
not cluster with their clean counterparts until the last layer,
preferring to reside in the target cluster regions. Even at
conv5, the poisons reside closer to the target class distribu-
tion than does the centroid of the poison class. Like in Sec.
3.2, this implies that they must adopt features similar to the
target instance to “rope in” the target to the poison class side
of the boundary. We see here especially that the features
adopted by the the poisons are similar to the target at all
levels of compositionality, from the basic edges and color
patches in conv1 to the higher level semantic features in
conv5. Additionally, MetaPoison is able to find ways to do
this without the need to explicitly collide features. Finally,
notice that neither the poisons nor target move to the poi-
son class cluster until the final layer. This suggests that the
poison perturbations are taking on the higher–rather than
lower–level semantic features of the target. This behavior
may also be a telltale signal that the target is compromised
by data poisoning and could potentially be exploited for a
future defense
J. Broader implications
The ability of MetaPoison to attack real-world systems
(trained-from-scratch, black-box, enterprise-grade) with
scalable and considerable success (full CIFAR-10 dataset,
using poison budgets <0.5%) is unprecedented and has nu-
merous broader implications regarding computer security
and data/model governance. While a full discussion should
involve all stakeholders, we provide here some initial com-
ments.
First, data and model governance is of utmost importance
when it comes to, among other things, mitigating data poi-
soning. Bursztein (2018) provides some common-sense
steps to take when curating a training set. For example, one
should ensure that no single source of data accounts for a
large fraction of the training set or even of a single class,
so as to keep the poison budget low for a malicious data
contributor. Doing a dark launch is another option: compare
the outputs of the new (poisoned) model against that of the
old model on the same input. This option can catch the
attack if the target shows up during the dark launch period,
but if new model is rolled out before the target shows up,
then it will still be vulnerable to the targeted attack.
Second, it is easier to defend against wholesale model skew-
ing attacks which aim to reduce overall model performance
or to bias it toward some direction. Targeted attacks such
as ours, on the other hand, are far more difficult to mitigate,
since the overall model behavior is unchanged and the tar-
get input on which the model’s behavior is changed is not
known to the victim. Yet the consequences of a successful
targeted attack are just as dire, if not more. Further, it is un-
likely that mitigations or defenses against targeted poisoning
attacks will ever be fully sufficient. Thus, systems should
rely on additional auxiliary measures, such as interpretabil-
ity techniques (Kim et al., 2017), to make security-critical
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decisions.
Third, at the current moment, the computational power re-
quired to craft MetaPoison examples exceeds that of evasion
attacks by a large margin. It takes 6 GPU-hours to craft a set
of 500 poisons on CIFAR-10 for 60 steps, and 8 GPU-hours
to craft a set of 5000 poisons. For larger datasets, the re-
sources required would scale linearly or superlinearly. Thus,
unless MetaPoison is the only way for an attacker to achieve
their objective, it is unlikely to be the dominant threat to
real-world systems. That said, future research may reveal
ways the MetaPoison algorithm can be modified to run more
efficiently. Therefore it is imperative for further research on
mitigation strategies, as well as further discussions on how
As a final note, data poisoning is not limited to nefarious
uses. For example, it can be used to “watermark” copy-
righted data with diverse, undetectable perturbations; the
model can then be queried with the target to determine
whether the copyrighted data was used during training.
K. Further examples of data poisons
Figures 17 and 18 show more examples of the crafted data
poisons in several galleries. Each gallery corresponds to
a different target image (shown on top from left to right).
These poisons are crafted with poison parameters  = 8,
c = 0.04. We always show the first 24 poisons (in the
default CIFAR order) for the first three target images taken
in order from the CIFAR validation set.
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Figure 17. Poison dogs. These example poisons from top to bottom correspond to the targets from left to right, e.g. if poisons from the top
3x8 gallery are included in the training dataset, then the first bird is classified as a dog. Images shown are dogs 0-23 from the CIFAR
training set and birds 0-2 from the CIFAR validation set.
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Figure 18. Poison frogs. These example poisons from top to bottom correspond to the targets from left to right, e.g. if poisons from the
top 3x8 gallery are included in the training dataset, then the first airplane is classified as a frog. Images shown are frogs 0-23 from CIFAR
training set and planes 0-2 from the CIFAR validation set.
